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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce the general concept
of coded power control (CPC) in a particular setting of the
interference channel. Roughly, the idea of CPC consists in
embedding information (about a random state) into the transmit
power levels themselves: in this new framework, provided the
power levels of a given transmitter can be observed (through
a noisy channels) by other transmitters, a sequence of power
levels of the former can therefore be used to coordinate the
latter. To assess the limiting performance of CPC (and therefore
the potential performance brought by this new approach), we
derive, as a first step towards many extensions of the present
work, a general result which not only concerns power control
(PC) but also any scenario involving two decision-makers (DMs)
which communicate through their actions and have the following
information and decision structures. We assume that the DMs
want to maximize the average of an arbitrarily chosen instanta-
neous payoff function which depends on the DMs’ actions and
the state realization. DM 1 is assumed to know non-causally the
state (e.g., the channel state) which affects the common payoff
while the other, say DM 2, has only a strictly causal knowledge
of it. DM 1 can only use its own actions (e.g., power levels) to
inform DM 2 about its best action in terms of payoff. Importantly,
DM 2 can only monitor the actions of DM 1 imperfectly and
DM 1 does not observe DM 2. The latter assumption leads
us to exploiting Shannon-theoretic tools in order to generalize
an existing theorem which provides the information constraint
under which the payoff is maximized. The derived result is then
exploited to fully characterize the performance of good CPC
policies for a given instance of the interference channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider two decision-makers (DMs) and that each of them
has to select actions or take decisions repeatedly to reach a
certain objective say to maximize an average payoff function.
Furthermore, assume that there might be an interest for them
in exchanging information e.g., about a random system state
which can affect their payoff but that no dedicated communi-
cation channel is available for this purpose. Therefore, the only
way to communicate for a DM is to use his own actions. Al-
though the idea of communicating through actions seems to be
quite natural and is in fact used more or less implicitly in real
life scenarios e.g., in economics (see [1]), it appears that, apart
from a few exceptions focused on specific problems of control
(see e.g., [2]), it has obviously not penetrated yet engineering
problems and definitely not wireless communications. It turns
out that important wireless problems such as power control
(PC) or radio resource allocation can draw much benefits from
being revisited from the new perspective of communication
through actions. Because of its importance and ability to
easily illustrate the proposed approach, the problem of PC
in interference networks has been selected for the application
of the main and general result derived in this paper; note that
the latter concerns any decision-making problem which has
the same structure (see Sec. II) and generalizes [3] and [4].
In the context of PC, the DMs are transmitters (Txs)
and the system state is typically given by the state of the
communication channel between the Txs and receivers (Rxs);
we will use the term DM (resp. Tx) when the general case
(resp. the specific case of PC) is concerned. Quite often, each
Tx possesses a partial knowledge of the channel state and,
in general, there is an incentive for the Txs to exchange the
corresponding knowledge between them. Coded PC assumes
that this knowledge is transferred from one Tx to another
(or others) by encoding the information of the former into
a sequence of power levels which are observed by the latter.
In this paper, we assume two DMs, that they have a common
payoff, and that there is one DM (DM 1) which is informed
with the current realization of the state and possibly those
associated with the coming stages. DM 2 is only informed of
the state in a strictly causal manner and can observe his on
power levels. The considered scenario is, in particular, relevant
in cognitive radio (CR) settings. In typical CR scenarios, the
primary Tx is assumed to be passive and the secondary Tx
adapts to what it observes. But, it might be of interest to design
primary Txs which coordinate in an active manner the usage
of radio resources, which is exactly what coded power control
(CPC) allows; one of the salient features of CPC is that inter-
ference can be managed directly in the radio-frequency domain
and does not require baseband detection or decoding, which is
very useful in heterogeneous networks. Another body of works
which can be mentioned is given by works on distributed
PC and especially those on best response dynamics (BRD)
algorithms which include the original iterative water-filling
algorithm [5]. Existing BRD algorithms implementations for
PC (see e.g., [6][7][8]) typically assume SINR (signal-to-
noise plus interference ratio) feedback and individual channel
state information (CSI) and do not exploit the key idea of
communicating through the power levels. Encoding power
levels allows one to construct PC policies possessing at least
three salient features which are generally not available for
BRD-based PC: there is no convergence problem and this
whatever the payoff functions; efficient solutions (e.g., in terms
of sum-payoff) can be obtained; both the cases of discrete
and continuous power levels can be easily treated. Since we
focus on optimal PC policies and make the choice of an
asymmetric information structure whereas BRD algorithms
rely on a symmetric one, no explicit comparison with BRD
algorithms is conducted but CPC can be applied to symmetric
scenarios as well.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider two DMs which want to coordinate through their
actions. Let Xj , |Xj | < ∞, the action alphabet of DM
j ∈ {1, 2}, and X0, |X0| <∞, the random state alphabet. The
states are assumed to be i.i.d. and generated from a random
variable X0 whose realizations are in X0 and distribution is
denoted by ρ. Note that the finiteness assumption is not only
realistic (e.g., power levels are discrete in modern cellular
systems) but also allows the continuous case to be treated by
using classical arguments [9]. The strategies of DM 1 and 2
are sequences of mappings, (σi, τi)i≥1, which are respectively
defined by:{
σi : X T0 ×X
i−1
1 → X1
τi : X
i−1
0 × Y
i−1 ×X i−12 → X2
(1)
where T is the total number of stages, i ∈ {1, ..., T }, and Y ,
|Y| <∞, is the observation alphabet of DM 2. The definition
of the strategy for DM 1 indicates that we assume a non-causal
knowledge of the state. The most typical situation in PC is to
assume that two phases are available (training phase, action
phase) and one state is known in advance to adjust the power
level. This special case can be obtained by setting T = 2
that is, i ∈ {1, 2}. There are many reasons why we consider
here that T might be greater than two. We will only provide
three of them, which better explains how the non-causality
assumption should be understood. First, the result derived in
Sec. III can be used for a large variety of settings and not
only PC. Second, the proposed approach can be applied to the
case where the state is not i.i.d. (e.g., to the B−stage block
i.i.d. case, B ≥ 1). Indeed, there exist wireless communication
standards which assume the channel to be constant over several
time-slots and the proposed approach suggests that gains can
be obtained by varying the power level from time-slot to time-
slot even if the channel is constant. Third, it becomes more and
more common to exploit the forecasted trajectory of a mobile
user to optimize the system [10], which makes our approach
relevant when the channel state is interpreted as the path loss.
Concerning the chosen definition for the strategy of DM 2,
several comments are in order. First, note that DM 2 is not
assumed to monitor actions of DM 1 perfectly. Rather, they are
monitored through an observation channel which is assumed
to be discrete, memoryless, and to verify P (y|x0, x1, x2) =
Γ(y|x1), where y ∈ Y is a realization of the channel output
associated with the input (x0, x1, x2). Second, note that, the
strategy of DM 2 is defined such that it can choose an action at
every stage and not only at the end of a block or sequence of
stages as it would be for a classical block decoder. Therefore,
contrarily to [3], DM 1 does not need to observe the actions of
DM 2 and DM 2 has only access to imperfect observations of
the actions chosen by DM 1. Interestingly, we will see that the
fact that DM 1 does not observe DM 2 induces no performance
loss in terms of payoff.
The instantaneous or stage payoff function for the DMs
is denoted by w(x0, x1, x2). Since the state is random, we
will consider as general case the problem of reaching a
certain performance level in terms of expected payoff E[w] =∑
(x0,x1,x2)
P (x0, x1, x2)w(x0, x1, x2). Roughly, the task of
DM 1 is to maximize the expected payoff by finding the best
tradeoff between reaching a good payoff for the current stage
and revealing enough information about the future realizations
of the state to coordinate for the next stages. The ability for
two DMs to coordinate their actions i.e., to reach a certain
value for the expected payoff can be translated in terms of
joint distribution over X0 × X1 × X2, which leads us to the
notion of implementable distribution [3].
Definition 1 (Implementability). The distribution
Q(x0, x1, x2) is implementable if there exists a pair of
strategies (σi, τi)i≥1 such that as t → +∞ we have for all
(x0, x1, x2),
1
t
t∑
i=1
∑
y
PX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi(x0, x1, x2, y)→ Q(x0, x1, x2)
(2)
where PX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi is the joint distribution induced by
(σi, τi)i≥1 at stage i.
Importantly, note that, since the expectation opera-
tor is linear, a certain value for E[w] is reachable if
and only if there exists an implementable distribution.
The goal of the next section is precisely to charac-
terize the set of reachable expected payoffs EQ[w] =∑
(x0,x2,x2,y)
Q(x0, x1, x2)Γ(y|x1)w(x0, x1, x2), which thus
amounts to characterizing the set of implementable distribu-
tions over X0 ×X1 ×X2.
III. MAIN ANALYTICAL RESULT
Notation: ∆(A) will stand for the set of distributions over
the generic discrete set A. Using this notation, the main
analytical result of this paper can be stated.
Theorem 1. Let Q ∈ ∆(X0 × X1 × X2) with∑
(x1,x2)
Q(x0, x1, x2) = ρ(x0). The distribution Q is imple-
mentable if and only if there exists Q ∈ ∆(X0×X1×X2×Y)
which verifies the following information constraint:
IQ(X0;X2) ≤ IQ(X1;Y |X0, X2) (3)
where the arguments of the mutual information IQ(.) are
defined from Q and Q(x0, x1, x2, y) = Q(x0, x1, x2)Γ(y|x1).
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Converse proof: We first start with providing a lemma
which is used at the end of the proof and concludes the section.
Lemma 1. The function Φ : Q 7→ IQ(X0;X2) −
IQ(X1;Y |X0, X2) is convex over the set of distributions
Q ∈ ∆(X0×X1×X2×Y) that verify
∑
(x1,x2,y)Q(x0,x1,x2,y)
=
ρ(x0) and Q(x0, x1, x2, y) = Γ(y|x1)P (x0, x1, x2), with ρ
and Γ fixed.
Proof of Lemma 1: The function Φ can be rewritten
as Φ(Q) = HQ(X0)−HQ(Y,X0|X2) +HQ(Y |X0, X2, X1).
The first term HQ(X0) = −
∑
x0
ρ(x0) log ρ(x0) is a constant
w.r.t. Q. The third term is linear w.r.t. Q since, with Γ fixed,
HQ(Y |X0, X2, X1) =
−
∑
x0,x1,x2,y
Q(x0, x1, x2, y) logP (y|x0, x1, x2)
= −
∑
x0,x1,x2,y
Q(x0, x1, x2, y) log Γ(y|x1) (4)
It is therefore sufficient to prove that HQ(Y,X0|X2) is con-
cave. Let λ1 ∈ [0, 1], λ2 = 1 − λ1, (Q1, Q2) ∈ ∆2(X0 ×
X1 ×X2 ×Y) and Q = λ1Q1 + λ2Q2. By using the standard
notation A0 = ∅, An = (A1, ..., An), we have that:
HQ(Y,X0|X2) = −
∑
x0,x2,y
(∑
x1,i
λiQi(x0, x1, x2, y)
)
log
[∑
x1,i
λiQi(x0, x1, x2, y)∑
i λiP
Qi
X2
(x2)
]
(5)
= −
∑
x0,x2,y
(∑
i
λi
∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)
)
log
[∑
i λi
∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)∑
i λiP
Qi
X2
(x2)
]
(6)
≥ −
∑
i
λi
∑
x0,x2,y
(∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)
)
log
[
λi
∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)
λiP
Qi
X2
(x2)
]
(7)
= −
∑
i
λi
∑
x0,x2,y
(∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)
)
log
[∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)
P
Qi
X2
(x2)
]
(8)
= λ1HQ1(Y,X0|X2) + λ2HQ2(Y,X0|X2) (9)
where the inequality comes from the log sum inequality [9].
Now we want to prove that if Q is implementable,
then Q has to verify the information constraint. Assum-
ing Q is implementable means that there exists (σi, τi)i≥1
such that the empirical distribution P (t)X0,X1,X2,Y (.) =
1
t
∑t
i=1 PX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi(.) can be made arbitrarily close to
Q; this argument is used at the end of the proof. We have:
t∑
i=1
IPX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi (X0;X2) =
t∑
i=1
I(X0,i;X2,i) (10)
(a)
=H(Xt0)−
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i|X2,i) (11)
=H(Xt0, Y
t, Xt2)−H(Y
t, Xt2|X
t
0)−
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i|X2,i)
(12)
≤H(Xt0, Y
t, Xt2)−H(Y
t|Xt0)−
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i|X2,i) (13)
≤H(Xt0, Y
t, Xt2)−H(Y
t|Xt0, X
t
1, X
t
2)−
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i|X2,i)
(14)
(b)
=H(Xt0, Y
t, Xt2)−
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i|X2,i)
−
t∑
i=1
H(Yi|X0,i, X1,i, X2,i) (15)
(c)
≤
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i, Yi, X2,i|X2,i)−H(X0,i|X2,i)
−H(Yi|X1,i, X0,i, X2,i) (16)
=
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i, Yi|X2,i)−H(X0,i|X2,i)
−H(Yi|X1,i, X0,i, X2,i) (17)
=
t∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Yi|X0,i, X2,i) (18)
=
t∑
i=1
IPX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi (X1;Y |X0, X2) (19)
where: (a) comes from the fact that (X0,i)i is i.i.d.
and the chain rule for entropy; (b) holds because the ob-
servation channel from DM 1 to DM 2 is assumed to
be discrete and memoryless namely, P (yt|xt0, xt1, xt2) =∏t
i=1 p(yi|x0,i, x1,i, x2,i); (c) holds by the chain rule and
because X2,i is a deterministic function of the past: X2,i =
τi (X0,1, Y1, X2,1, . . . , X0,i−1, Yi−1, X2,i−1). Now, since Φ is
convex (by Lemma 1), we know that
I
P
(t)
X0,X1,X2,Y
(X1;Y |X0, X2)− IP (t)
X0 ,X1,X2,Y
(X0;X2) ≥
1
t
t∑
i=1
IPX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi (X1;Y |X0, X2)
− IPX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi (X0;X2) (20)
The converse follows by observing that the first term
of the above inequality can be made arbitrarily close to
IQ(X1;Y |X0, X2) − IQ(X0;X2) and the second term has
been proven to be non-negative.
Implementability (sketch): The goal here is to prove
that if the information constraint is verified for Q∗, then
an implementable pair of strategies (σi, τi)i≥1 can be found.
Therefore, in contrast with the converse, finding a particular
code such as a block code with long codewords is sufficient,
which allows one to reuse the standard machinery for the
transmission of distorted sources. Assume T = nB large
where n is the codeword length and B the number of blocks.
Denote b as the block index. The methodology is the follow-
ing: construct a source codebook and a channel codebook by
choosing each symbols of each sequences in the codebooks
independently using the same distribution Q∗ (more precisely
marginal distributions of Q∗). DM 1 then uses joint typicality
to find in the source codebook the sequence of actions of
DM 2 for block b + 1, and sends the corresponding channel
codeword (the one with the same index). DM 2 receives a
sequence yn[b] through the observation channel and decodes
the index chosen by DM 1 via joint typicality of the four
sequences on block b. He uses this index to find in the source
codebook his sequence of actions for block b+1. At last, for
block b = 0, DM 2 chooses an arbitrary codeword which is
known to DM 1. There is an error if we don’t have existence
and/or unicity of these codewords. The probability of error is
made arbitrarily small thanks to the information constraint (3)
(the analysis, although not trivial, is standard and need the
well known Markov Lemma and Packing Lemma). Under this
setting, as Q∗ meets the information constraint, the empirical
distribution Q(T ) which is induced by this separate source
channel coding i.e.,
Q(T )(v) =
1
nB
[
N
(
v | xn0 (0), x
n
1 (0), x
n
2 (0), y
n(0)
)
+
B−1∑
b=1
N
(
v | xn0 (b), x
n
1 (b), x
n
2 (b), y
n(b)
)] (21)
converges to Q∗, where N (v|vn) is a notation for counting
the occurrences of v in vn, v = (x0, x1, x2, y) here. The
proof of this involves definitions of typical sets and the triangle
inequality.
B. Comments on Theorem 1
Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows. DM 2’s actions
(represented by X2) correspond to a joint source-channel
decoding operation with distortion on the information source
(which is represented by X0). To be reachable, the distortion
rate has to be less than the transmission rate allowed by the
channel whose input and output are respectively represented
by X1 and Y . Therefore, the pair S = (X0, X2) seems to
play the same role as the side information in channels with
state. Indeed, the implementability proof shows that DM 1 uses
in particular (xn0 (b), x̂n2 (b)) while DM 2 uses (xn0 (b), xn2 (b)).
Asymptotically, the encoder (DM 1) and decoder (DM 2) have
the same side information (which explains by the way the fact
DM 1 does not need to observe DM 2 does not induce any
performance loss). Furthermore, note that xn0 (b + 1), which
plays the role of the message to be encoded, is independent
of the side information. Classical coding schemes (such as
block Markov coding) can thus be re-exploited. However, the
above arguments fails for the converse proof which has to
deal with arbitrary coding schemes or strategies. It can no
longer be assumed that the side information be independent
of the information source vector. This is one of the reasons
why the converse proof has to be rethought. Another reason
is that classical results (such as Fano’s inequality) which rely
on block decoding are not exploitable anymore since DM 2
has to be able to act (to decode) at any stage or time instance.
As another type of comments on Theorem 1, it can be
noted that the information constraint has a very attractive
property: the problem of maximizing the expected payoff takes
a particularly simple form. Indeed, by defining a one-to-one
mapping between the quadruplets (x0, x1, x2, y) and the finite
set {1, 2, ..., L}, L = |X0 × X1 × X2 × Y|, the optimization
problem of interest can be described as follows:
minimize −Eq[w] = −
L∑
ℓ=1
qℓwℓ
subject to Iq(X0;X2)− Iq(X1;Y |X0, X2) ≤ 0
−qℓ ≤ 0
−1 +
L∑
ℓ=1
qℓ = 0
∀x0,
∑
ℓ∈LX0 (x0)
qℓ − ρ(x0) = 0
∀(x1, y),
∑
ℓ∈LX1,Y
(x1,y)
qℓ
∑
ℓ∈LX1
(x1)
qℓ
− Γ(y|x1) = 0
(22)
where qℓ is the probability of a given quadruplet
(x0, x1, x2, y), wℓ is the value of the corresponding payoff,
the vector q = (q1, ..., qL) represents the distribution Q, and
the sets of indices LX0(x0), LX1,Y (x1, y), LX1 (x1) merely
translate the marginalization conditions. By Lemma 1, it
follows that the above optimization problem is convex, which
makes easy the determination of the information-constrained
maximum of the expected payoff. A simple and useful upper
bound for this maximum is Eρmax(x1,x2) w(x0, x1, x2). This
bound will be referred to as the costless communication case
in Sec. IV. Indeed, this bound can be attained in the ideal
scenario where: given the knowledge of the coming state x0,
DM 1 computes an optimal solution for the action pair for the
coming stage (x∗1, x∗2) ∈ argmax(x1,x2) w(x0, x1, x2) and can
inform DM 2 of x∗2 without any cost. If the state is stationary
for say S stages and X1 = X2, a simple strategy for DM 1 can
be as follows: x1(1) = x∗2, x1(2) = x∗1, ..., x1(S) = x∗1. This
allows DM 2 to choose an optimal action for i ∈ {2, ..., S}.
It can be shown that considering the S−stage block i.i.d. case
amounts to multiplying the left term of (3) by 1
S
, which makes
the info constraint arbitrarily mild as S grows large.
IV. APPLICATION TO POWER CONTROL OVER
INTERFERENCE CHANNELS
The main goal is to assess the performance of simple
CPC policies and those of good policies, the performance
of the latter is obtained by exploiting Theorem 1. A flat-
fading interference channel (IC) with two Tx-Rx pairs is
considered. Transmissions are assumed to be time-slotted and
synchronized. For j ∈ {1, 2} and “k = −j” (−j stands for
the Tx other than j), the SINR at receiver j at a given stage
writes as SINRj = gjjxjσ2+gkjxk where xj ∈ X
IC
j = {0, Pmax}
is the power level chosen by Tx j, gjk represents the channel
gain of link jk, and σ2 the noise variance. We assume that:
gjk ∈ {gmin, gmax} is i.i.d. and Bernouilli distributed gjk ∼
B(pjk) with P (gjk = gmin) = pjk. We define SNR[dB] =
10 log10
Pmax
σ2
and set gmin = 0.1, gmax = 1.9, σ2 = 1.
The low and high interference regimes (LIR, HIR) are respec-
tively defined by (p11, p12, p21, p22) = (0.5, 0.9, 0.9, 0.5) and
(p11, p12, p21, p22) = (0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.5). The assumed pay-
off is wIC(x0, x1, x2) =
∑2
j=1 f(SINRj(x0, x1, x2)) where
f(a) = log(1+ a) unless stated otherwise. At last we assume
that Y ≡ X1. We consider four CPC policies :
◮ the full power control (FPC) policy xj = Pmax for every
stage. FPC requires no CSI at all;
◮ the semi-coordinated PC (SPC) policy x2 = Pmax, x†1 ∈
argmaxx1 w
IC(x0, x1, Pmax). SPC requires the knowledge of
the current state realization at Tx1;
◮ the optimal CPC policy (OCPC) whose performance are
obtained, in particular, when the problem has the information
structure of Theorem 1;
◮ the costless communication case (see Sec. III-B) for which
the maximum of wIC can be reached at any stage. Fig. 1 and 2
depict the relative gain in % in terms of average payoff versus
SNR[dB] which is obtained by FPC, SPC, OCPC, and costless
case. Compared to FPC, gains are very significant whatever the
interference regime and provided the SNR has realistic values.
Compared to SPC, the gain is of course less impressive since
SPC is precisely a coordinated PC scheme but, in the HIR and
when the communication cost is negligible, gains as high as
25% can be obtained with f(a) = log(1 + a) and 45% with
f(a) = a.
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Fig. 1. Relative gain in terms of expected payoff (“OCPC/FPC - 1” in [%])
vs SNR[dB] obtained with CPC (with and without communication cost) when
the reference power control policy is to transmit at full power (FPC).
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Fig. 2. The difference with Fig. 1 is that the reference power control policy
is the SPC policy. Additionally, the top curve is obtained with f(a) = a.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although some assumptions made in this paper might be
too restrictive in some application scenarios, it is essential to
understand that the used methodology to derive the optimal
performance is general. It can be applied to analyze the per-
formance of coded power allocation, coded interference align-
ment, etc, with other information structures and by considering
N ≥ 2 individual payoffs instead of a common one (e.g.,
in a game-theoretic setting [3]). The methodology to assess
the performance of good coded policies consists in deriving
the right information constraint(s) by building the proof on
Shannon theory for the problem of multi-source coding with
distortion over multi-user channels wide side information and
then to use this constraint to find an information-constrained
maximum of the payoff (common payoff case) or the set
of Nash equilibrium points which are compatible with the
constraint (non-cooperative game case). Note that assuming
i.i.d. from stage to stage the state(s) leads in fact to the worst-
case scenario for the information constraint. On the other hand,
the costless communication case provides an upper bound
for the expected payoff. As a key observation, the commu-
nication structure of a multi-person decision-making problem
is a multiuser channel, which makes multi-terminal Shannon
theory not only relevant for pure communication problems
but also for any multi-person decision-making problem. This
observation opens new challenges for Shannon-theorists since
decision-making problems define new channels for instance.
It can also be observed that the need to design payoff-oriented
communications urges a rethinking of the problem of coding.
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